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Managing Historical Capital in
Shandong: Museum,
Monument, and Memory in
Provincial China
JAMES A. FLATH
Introduction
For most people, the written texts of history are only pale reflections of the
history they see in their everyday surroundings. An ancient building, a local
museum, a statue in a park, or even a notable landscape can carry historical
narratives in ways that are more immediate and lasting than any well-re-
searched discourse on history. Yet these publicly accessible historical represen-
tations are also highly selective in the subjects they portray. Visitors often leave
with little more than an impression of the event, person, or place represented
by the site, and perhaps a souvenir or T-shirt as evidence of their historical
experience. So although the historical site is a poor representation of the actual
past, the immediacy and stature of historical monuments and museums imbue
them with a strong capacity to configure history in the present.
This discussion considers how the past informs the present through the
preserved and monumentally represented remains of provincial Chinese
history. China, as we are frequently reminded, has the world’s longest continu-
ous history and probably the greatest number of historical sites. We are
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generally aware of the national symbols, like the Great Wall and the Forbidden
City, which represent China at home and abroad. But beyond these monoliths
are the hundreds and thousands of sites and artifacts that represent history on
a less grand but more pervasive scale. By examining how those properties are
protected, presented, and managed under various regimes, we may begin to
understand the messages that the public historical system has been expected to
carry, and the relation of public history to public policy. In general, although
the state has always reserved the right to interpret history, most public history
is actually managed by provincial, regional, and increasingly commercial
interests that represent immediate interests first and leave the connection with
the nation to develop on its own tenuous ground. The study of regional Chinese
historical representation, therefore, demonstrates that national history is not
the sum of its parts, and that the making of public history occurs at multiple
levels of bureaucracy and through many levels of patronage.
The province of Shandong is an ideal subject for this study because it is
characterized by one of the most diverse environments in Northeast China. To
the east, Jiaodong Peninsula gives the province a lengthy coastline, the ports of
Qingdao, Yantai, Weihai, and Penglai, and consequently a history of colonial-
ism and imperialism. The central plains to the west are the cultural and political
heartland of the province, historically occupied by several pre-dynastic states,
the provincial capital of Jinan, a deeply rooted agrarian tradition, and historical
figures as famed as Confucius and Mencius. Further to the south, the plains
give way to a mountainous terrain that is home to China’s most revered peak,
two of the country’s earliest Neolithic cultures, and the revolutionary base of
the provincial branch of the Chinese Communist Party. But the south is also
home to some of the poorest of Shandong’s 75 million peasants. Poverty
prevails also in the rural hinterlands of the west and southwest, where the
border regions with Henan and Hebei once produced China’s most famous
bandits and peasant uprisings. This geographic and social diversity, not to
mention well over five millennia of historical experience, has left the province
with a complex historical identity supported by an extensive body of historical
artifacts and monuments. For the province of Shandong, public history consists
of the complex negotiations between that identity, the permanent remains of
history, and the efforts to control their meaning in the present.
The Legacy of Public History in Shandong
In the early twentieth century, the first modern museums in Shandong
enjoyed a brief period of remarkable success.1 Foreign involvement ensured
1. As Lawrence Sickman pointed out, Confucian temples had been collecting historical
steles in their compounds for centuries before the arrival of any Western concept of the
museum. See Lawrence Sickman, “Provincial Museums of North China,” The Open Court 1,
no. 937 (1936): 65. Attention could also be drawn to the excavation and preservation of the
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that many of the artifacts collected for display purposes were destined for
foreign museums, but at the same time several museums were established
to display artifacts in their home province. The earliest museum in
Shandong appeared in 1887 when missionary I. S. Wright opened the Yidu
Museum in the east-central city of Qingzhou. Missionaries in the coastal city
of Chefoo (Yantai) followed this lead with a small education museum as
early as 1902,2 and in 1912 the city opened another exhibit hall in the
Wuliang Shrine by a Confucian scholar in the eighteenth  century. See Wu Hung, The Wu
Liang Shrine: The Ideology of Early Chinese Pictorial Art (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1989). Although not museums or archaeological sites per se, these examples demonstrate that
if the institution of the museum was a foreign invention, the concept of collecting and
exhibiting historical artifacts was not.
2. Franz Boas, communication to Berthold Laufer, American Museum of Natural History,
10 April 1902.
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Peizhen Library.3 In 1904, the science and history exhibits of Yidu Museum
were moved to the provincial capital of Jinan, and the institute was renamed
Guangzhiyuan (Academy of Broad Knowledge). The first really domestic
Shandong museum appeared in 1906, when a returning overseas student, in
association with the Tai’an Education Bureau, established the Tai’an Mu-
seum at the foot of the famous Mt. Tai. This was joined in 1916 by the
Provincial Library, where the provincial inspector of education established
an exhibition hall for the collection and preservation of ancient bronzes and
steles. This would eventually become the Shandong Provincial Museum,
which in 1936 was reckoned to be one of the best in China’s nascent
provincial museum system.4 Attendance at the museums was exceptionally
high, and during its first four months in Jinan, the Guangzhiyuan attracted
102,000 visitors.5 Undeterred by the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in
1911, tourism continued to grow. By 1912 the museum registered an annual
attendance of 230,000;6 by 1919 attendance had increased to 400,000.7 In
the early 1920s, a foreign observer noted “the turnstile records hundreds of
thousands of visitors...during the pilgrimage season alone.”8 The Tai’an
Museum was no less popular, receiving some 215,000 visitors in 1910. On
one particular “ladies day,” some 2,000 women reportedly visited the Hall of
Rare Things.9
This period of apparent success was cut short when national political
authority began to crumble during the 1920s. Hopes for a republican
government under Sun Yat-sen had crumbled shortly after the 1911 revolu-
tion when Yuan Shikai, the erstwhile governor of Shandong, installed
himself as military dictator. Yuan’s death in 1916 was taken as an opportu-
nity for independent militarists to carve out personal domains across the
country, leading to the highly volatile circumstances of the so-called War-
lord Era. During this time, museums continued to develop in cities like
Beijing and Shanghai, but public cultural development was decidedly not a
priority for Zhang Zongchang (“the Dog Meat General”) and other warlord
governors in provincial Shandong.10
The research climate was not much brighter in Shandong, although some
early archaeological digs were conducted at the ancient Qi state city in Linzi,
and the discovery of the Neolithic Longshan culture site near Jinan in the
3. Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai hua dichu yu yanjiu, Shandong sheng 1860-1916 [Mod-
ernization in China, 1860-1916] (Taibei: Academica Sinica, 1982), 200.
4. Sickman, “Provincial Museums of North China,” 73.
5. William Geil, Eighteen Capitals of China (London: Constable & Co., 1911), 391.
6. Wang Hongdiao, Zhongguo bowuguanxue jichu [The Basis of Chinese Museology]
(Shanghai: Zhongguo Guji Chubanshe, 1990), 100.
7. Zhang, Zhongguo xiandai hua dichu yu yanjiu, Shandong sheng 1860-1916, 200. The total
attendance between 1911 and 1920 is recorded as 2.4 million.
8. Harry Franck, Wandering in Northern China (New York: The Century Co., 1923), 269.
9. Geil, Eighteen Capitals of China, 392.
10. Chinese museums in general (historical, commercial, science, etc.) grew from only ten
in 1928 to seventy-seven in 1936, before declining to a low of eight in 1944 and recovering to
seventeen by 1949. See Wang, Zhongguo bowuguanxue, 92.
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mid-1920s revolutionized the understanding of early China. The latter find
also led to the foundation of the Society for the Study of Shandong Antiqui-
ties. With delegates from the national Academica Sinica and the Shandong
Provincial Department of Education, the society represented an early step
toward organizing provincial antiquities into a national system.11 The exer-
cise of state control over archaeology and its findings was given the force of
law in 1930, when the government instated its first Law on the Preservation
of Ancient Objects.12 Such progress aside, the economic and political bank-
ruptcy of the time stifled most material history research, and most of the
archaeological record remained untouched.
Architecture provided another trove of historical resources, but as with
other artifacts, there were few attempts to exploit it as public property. As
public facilities, most Buddhist and Daoist temples had always been open to
visitors and ornamental bridges and arches dedicated to cultural and moral
paramours had long been designed and located with the intent of impress-
ing the common people. But as late as 1950, other forms of architecture that
are today regarded as public historical properties were then under the
continuing (if in many cases faltering) supervision of private interests. The
Shanxi-Shaanxi Huiguan (merchant association hall) in Liaocheng, for
example, had been alternately sacked by bandits and commandeered by
Warlords in the 1920s, but had nonetheless remained the property of the
original merchant association until 1938.13 A more prominent fixture was
the complex of structures devoted to Confucius in his hometown of Qufu.
While public veneration of Confucius was encouraged at local temples
throughout China and at the Confucius Temple in Qufu, most Qufu sites,
including the Kong (Confucius) family mansion and the Confucius Forest,
were still under the private management of the lineal descendants of the
Great Sage. When Harry Franck visited Qufu in the early 1920s, he noted
that large numbers of people made pilgrimages to the Confucius temple.
Concerning the Confucius forest and tomb of Confucius, however, he cited
a local guidebook: “Those with letters of introduction, or persons of distinc-
tion are the only ones admitted; but others may be by tipping the guard-
ian.”14
In terms of distinct modern monuments, the KMT government fared
only slightly better than it did with museums and historical architecture.
11. Li Chi, ed., Ch’eng-tzu-yai: The black pottery culture site at Lung-shan-chen in Li-
ch’eng-hsien, Shantung, trans. Kenneth Starr (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1956), 32.
12. J. David Murphy, Plunder and Preservation (Hong Kong, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 183. The law was revised in 1931 as the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of
the Law on the Preservation of Ancient Objects.
13. Ke Fang, Shan-Shaan Huiguan [Shanxi-Shaanxi Merchant Association] (Liaocheng,
Shandong: Jinling Shushe, 1997), 50.
14. Franck, Wandering in North China, 283. The Confucius family mansion had undergone
complete renovation in 1935 for the wedding of the seventy-third descendant of Confucius.
See Yang Hongxun, “Qufu ‘Yanshen Gongfu’ chucha baogao” [A Report on an Investigation of
Yanshan Palace], Wenwu cankao ziliao 10 (1957): 14.
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That is not to say that the KMT government failed to understand the
benefits of establishing a regime of monumental symbol. In fact, the
KMT occasionally pursued monumentalism quite aggressively, as can
be seen in the splendid Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and Memorial Hall in
Nanjing. Yet in provincial localities, there was little progress in estab-
lishing monuments to KMT history, or in appropriating the state sym-
bolism of previous regimes.
Of the few provincial monuments established during this time, most
were martyrs’ shrines, and they followed the museums in being strategi-
cally located near popular tour destinations. The first of these markers,
erected in 1928 at Jinan’s famed Baotu Springs and Tai’an’s Dai Temple,
were intended to commemorate the infamous “5-3” battle of earlier that
year, when a Chinese army clashed with Japanese troops then occupying
Jinan. In 1929, another “5-3” monument was erected on Mt. Tai, along with
a monument to commemorate the burial of Sun Yat-sen. Other shrines
were placed on Mt. Tai in 1933 and 1936 by former warlord Feng Yuxiang
to honor the martyrs of the 1911 Revolution and the 1924 Luanzhou
Uprising. But although he used state money for the latter, Feng’s tenuous
relationship with the KMT and his claim to a pivotal role in the Luanzhou
battle make it difficult to view these as true KMT monuments.15 The
conclusion of World War II provided a further opportunity to celebrate
martyrs, and in 1946 Mt. Tai received yet another commemoration of war
dead, as did Yantai the following year. These, however, made only a brief
contribution to KMT prestige before being taken over by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in 1948.16
In consideration of this record, it may be said that at the end of the KMT
mandate, the state of public history was problematic at best. The fact that
pilgrimage sites had historically received large numbers of visitors shows
that tourism and exhibition culture had been present in some form well
before the arrival of any Western conception of public history. Indeed, the
few early museums and monuments in Shandong owed no small part of their
success to being deliberately situated on traditional pilgrimage routes.
Although the KMT government evidently understood this resource, it
generally failed to exploit it. This is first of all symptomatic of a weak
government incapable of exerting a sustained interpretation of its central
role in history, through which it might have gained some legitimacy. But
secondly, the absence in most provincial locations of any publicly sponsored
historical site, museum, or monument indicates that by the late 1940s, the
concept of a history made for and accessible to the public was still in its
infancy.
15. Shandong Sheng Difang Zhi Bianxuan Weiyuanhui [Shandong Provincial Gazetteer
Editorial Committee], Shandong shengzhi: Taishan zhi [Shandong Provincial Gazetteer:
Taishan Gazetteer], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993), 35, 667.
16. Dong Chuanyuan, Shandong mingsheng guji [Scenic Spots and Historical Sites in
Shandong] (Jinan, Shandong: Youyi Chubanshe, 1989), 62.
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Material History in Mao-era Shandong
The management of material history entered a new stage of development
with the consolidation of communist power in Shandong after 1948. One
consequence of the overall failure of the KMT government to establish its
regime in symbol was that the incoming CCP was not required to deal with
leftover KMT symbolic capital. And because those monuments that did
remain commemorated the defeat of a common enemy (Japan, Manchu) or
the glory of common heroes (Sun Yat-sen), they could easily be incorporated
into revolutionary discourse. Ironically, the real material base for public
history would come into public possession through the nationalization of the
private assets of the wealthiest segment of society—the chief targets in the
class war that helped fuel the revolution. For populist revolutionaries who
had staked their reputation on overthrowing the “bourgeoisie” and other
“counter-revolutionaries,” the nationalization of mansions, monasteries,
ancestral shrines, and temples presented a complicated ideological prob-
lem. The result was at first a grudging recognition of key historical sites,
followed by a serious attempt during the Cultural Revolution to erase all but
the most important structures.
Cultural artifacts. Before coming to power in Shandong, the CCP had
already issued orders concerning artifact preservation under the conditions
of its land reform act, and had established a cultural artifact protection
agency (wenwu baoguan weiyuanhui). When the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) took Jinan in September of 1948, a fifty-person team was dispatched
to take charge of the cultural artifacts in the city. And as the CCP extended
its control across the country, Premier Zhou Enlai ordered the compilation
of a catalogue of architectural and cultural sites, which was forwarded to the
various units of the advancing PLA.17
These initial protection measures immediately extended to three top-
priority sites in Shandong: Dai Temple in Tai’an,18 the Confucian relics of
Qufu, and the Zoucheng relics of Mencius.19 Another committee of this
nature was established in southwestern Dongming County in 1950, al-
though with no significant artifacts to manage, its purpose is not entirely
clear. A fourth management committee was established in 1952 at the more
obvious location of the Daoist mountain retreat of Laoshan, followed in 1954 by
a committee to protect the former residence of the writer Pu Songling (1640-
1715), whose concern for folklore was shared by the populist CCP.20
17. Wang, Zhongguo bowuguanxue, 110-11.
18. Other Mt. Tai relics were brought under the responsibility of the city of Tai’an in 1956.
Shandong Sheng Difang Zhi Bianxuan Weiyuanhui,  Shandong shengzhi: Taishan zhi, 42.
19. The Mencius committee was reorganized at the country level in 1952. The Qufu
committee also went through a series of changes, going from county level in 1949, to provincial
in 1952, back to county in 1955. Jiang Yingjun, Shandong bowuguan tonglan (Beijing:
Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1993), 270.
20. Ibid., passim.
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In 1961, a major political shift occurred in the highest offices of the
communist party. Mao Zedong was sidelined, and Deng Xiaoping and Liu
Shaoqi proceeded to institute national social and economic reform. Provi-
sional Regulations on the Protection and Administration of the Cultural
Heritage established principles for central and local enforcement of artifact
protection measures, and a ranking system for recognized antiquities.21
These changes affected the management of provincial historical sites when
state-level recognition was extended to eight high-level archaeological sites
and antiquities. These included the above-mentioned Longshan Culture
site, the Warring States city sites of Qi (Linzi) and Lu (Qufu), Jinan’s Simen
Tower (ca. 570 AD) and Litangshan Shrine (ca. 600 AD), the Confucius
complex, and the artistically rich Han dynasty Wuliang tomb. Although the
program was embedded in politics and heavily favored central Shandong
and the provincial capital, the historical and archaeological value of each of
these sites is beyond question, and the reasons for their selection as state
level antiquities are relatively transparent.22
Museums. By the mid-1950s, provincial and regional cultural authorities
had also begun to establish and re-open museums. In 1956, the original
Guangzhiyuan Museum was reopened as the Shandong Provincial Mu-
seum—the first of its type in the People’s Republic of China.23 In 1958, local
museums were opened or reopened in Yantai, Zibo, and Pingdu. These
were followed in 1959 by museums in Qingdao, Jinan, Tai’an, and
Qingzhou. Also in 1959, Jinan opened a memorial hall for Li Qingzhao
(1084-c.1151), widely regarded as the most accomplished female poet in
Chinese history, followed in 1961 by another memorial hall to the patriotic
Song dynasty poet Xin Qiji (1140-1207), who led an uprising against the Jin
during an invasion in 1161.24
In many cases, the establishment of a museum also served the function of
preserving a historic building, despite the frequent religious and capitalist
“bad class background” of the host property. The Yantai City Museum, for
example, was located in the former Fujian Merchant Association Hall,
Pingdu Museum was located in a former Daoist temple, and both Qingdao
City Museum and the Provincial Museum in Jinan were located in former
Daoist monasteries. Similarly, the Jinan City Museum was established in the
Baotu Springs Garden, and the Zibo City Museum, Li Qingzhao Memorial
21. Murphy, Plunder and Preservation, 183.
22. Guoweiyuan gongbu [State Council Decree], March 4, 1961 in Wang Yongbo et al.
(Ed.), Qilu mingwu bolan (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), 309–26.
23. The Provincial Museum was first sanctioned in 1954. In keeping with its science
background, the Provincial Museum still contains a large natural history exhibit, consisting of
glass cases of exotic animals, mounted and in a macabre state of decay. The highlight of any visit
to the museum is certainly the giant bipedal “Shandongosaurus.” The inclusion of a six-legged
calf is apparently intended to represent an anomaly in the evolutionary process that links
Shandongosaurus to the present-day pandas and pangolins in the neighboring displays.
24. Jiang, Shandong bowuguan tonglan, 97, 57, 73. Although it was chartered in 1959, the
Qingdao City Museum did not open to the public until 1965.
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Hall, and Xin Qiji Memorial Hall were each located in former ancestral
halls.25
Monuments. In post-revolutionary Shandong it might be expected that
the provincial government would take measures to construct a network of
monuments to its revolution. Surprisingly, only two revolutionary monu-
ments were built before 1965: the Martyr’s Shrine and Exhibition Hall in
Jinan (1948), and the Yangshan Battle Memorial at Jinxian (1950). Two of
the monuments appearing after 1965 were devoted to somewhat unlikely
heroes: Zibo’s Jiao Yulu, a model party and political cadre member; and
Wang Jie, a former PLA soldier who had sacrificed himself to save his
comrades from a misplaced explosive. The third and last monument inaugu-
rated in 1965 was Jinan’s Liberation Tower, built on the site where the PLA
breached the city wall in 1948. In terms of independent provincial monu-
ments, therefore, the CCP fared no better in its first fifteen years in
Shandong than the KMT had during its mandate.
With the advent of the “Four Olds” campaign to eliminate “Old Customs,
Old Habits, Old Culture, and Old Thinking” and the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution in 1966, large segments of museum holdings and most
examples of ancient architecture were classified as feudal artifacts blocking
the path of China’s continuing revolution. Stripped of state protection, and
targeted for destruction by radical Red Guards, many of Shandong’s histori-
cal sites and much of the material basis for public history was obliterated.
One remarkable directive, possibly backed by the progressive Premier Zhou
Enlai in 1967, was the State Council Opinion Concerning Protection of
Cultural Relics and Books in the Cultural Revolution, which directed that
some historical sites and artifacts be retained as “bad examples.”26 This
directive could not protect many of China’s historical treasures, but it may
have intervened in the destruction of some of the most important of them.
Only with the death of Mao and arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, however,
did remaining historical properties regain any measure of security.
An overview of historical management up to the mid-1970s shows that
there were as many as ten historical museums, but no more than a dozen
protected historical sites in Shandong, some of which received only de facto
protection as active museum compounds. Considering the number of sites
that would later come to be designated as heritage properties, this appears
as a dismal record, suggesting that in Maoist China, material history was a
cultural liability for which both provincial and national governments
avoided responsibility. Certainly the resource shortages of the 1950s limited
25. The tendency to locate museums in existing traditional structures was continued in the
reform era. For example, Liaocheng Museum is in the former Shanxi-Shaanxi Huiguan,
Tengzhou City Museum and Longkou Museum are in former ancestral halls, and Weifang City
Museum was housed in the landlord mansion of Shihuyuan until being relocated to the new
economic development zone in 1999, where it is now accessible to a large international hotel,
casino, and Disney-like amusement park.
26. Murphy, Plunder and Preservation, 49.
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what cultural agencies could do with historic properties, but the policy
should also be seen in relation to Soviet influence and the 1956 National
Working Conference on Museums. According to the Three Natures and
Two Tasks resolution adopted at this conference, the “nature” of the
museum was to conduct scientific research, promote cultural education,
and collect and conserve artifacts and natural specimens, whereas the
“tasks” of the museum were to support scientific research and to serve the
people. According to the comments of Zheng Zhenduo, then Deputy
Minister of Culture, the nature and tasks of the museum were to be taken as
an organic whole. But in fact, the order in which these resolutions were
presented was a clear reflection of their relative priority, with artifact
collection and protection falling well behind the national priority of scien-
tific development.27 Stationary structures were expensive to maintain and
difficult to revise, and often contradicted the accepted truth of the revolu-
tion. For ideologues seeking to create a new culture, it was more efficient to
emphasize the theoretical aspects of historical materialism and a text-based
history of revolution that could be disseminated through the media.
Post-Mao Shandong: From Historical Materialism to Materialist History
The effective end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 brought about a
tentative return to the type of historical management that had begun with
state recognition of certain historical properties in 1961. The random
destruction of the Cultural Revolution had earlier been brought to an end,
but it was not until 1977 that provincial authorities began to account for
cultural relics, initiate protection policies, and build and restore museums
and archives. In 1979, the National Cultural Artifact Bureau also issued a
new directive, effectively reversing the 1956 policy by affirming artifact
collection as a top priority for museums.28 Sadly, due to the wide-scale
destruction of the 1960s, by this time there remained significantly fewer
artifacts to collect and preserve.
Reforming the historical system, 1977–1992. Under the 1977 commit-
ment to preservation, provincial recognition was extended to a total of 146
sites across Shandong. These included a total of eight stone “grottoes,
statuary, and carvings,” twenty-six examples of “ancient architecture and
historical memorial structures,” fifty-two “ruins and relics,” and thirty-one
“ancient tombs and burial grounds.” The antiquities included a selection of
badly damaged sculptures (often of religious nature); several examples of
ancient architecture, including the home of Pu Songling and the Confucius
27. Su Donghai, “Museums and Museum Philosophy in China,” Nordisk Museologi  2
(1995), 61-80, reprinted in <http://www.umu.se/nordic.museology/NM/952/Su.html/>.
28. Zhou Changfu et al., Bowuguanxue Yanjiu (Qingdao, Shandong: Qingdao Haiyang
Daxue, 1992), 9.
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Temple in Qufu; and ancient tombs, including those of Mencius’ famous
mother and the Sultan of Sulu in Dezhou, who died there on a fifteenth-
century tribute mission to Beijing.29 The fact that many of these had been
officially recognized before the Cultural Revolution shows that earlier
statutes were no longer considered effective.30
The 1977 provisions targeted many of Shandong’s most important an-
cient cultural sites, but the province also included twenty-nine revolution-
ary artifacts and memorials, commemorating visits to various locations in
Shandong by Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De. These were joined
by civil war battlegrounds, martyrs’ shrines, and memorials to Shandong
revolutionaries. In continuing recognition of imperialism and the Chinese
response are a number of sites dedicated to heroic resistance to Japan, and
the site of the Juye Incident, in which extremists murdered two German
missionaries in 1898.31 Indicative of the political uncertainty and continuing
radicalism of the period was the 1977 promotion of the ancestral home of
Kang Sheng to the status of Kang Sheng Memorial. But although this hard-
line CCP security chief could conceivably have attained such an honour in his
hometown of Zhucheng, it comes as no surprise that Zhucheng historians
neglected to memorialize Jiang Qing, who left this city first to become a
Shanghai movie-star, then to wed Chairman Mao, and finally to become public
enemy number one as the putative instigator of the Cultural Revolution.
The dissolution of the Kang Sheng Memorial in 1980 was a clear indication
of a further shift in the political wind, as Deng Xiaoping consolidated his grip
on power and began to move the country into the reform era of economic
liberalization. The national level of cultural protection resumed activities in
1982, when state authorities issued the Law on the Protection of Cultural
Relics and published their first list of national heritage sites. In Shandong, this
included only the Tang Dynasty Lingyan Temple near Mt. Tai, the Penglai
Seawall and Pavilion, and the Neolithic Dawenkou site near Tai’an.32 This was
followed in 1988 by a third list that included a number of the sites already under
provincial protection, including Liaocheng’s Shanxi-Shaanxi Merchant Asso-
ciation Hall, and the Guangyue building, best known as the temporary head-
quarters of the Qianlong emperor during one of his southern excursions. These
were joined by the site of the Sino-Japanese naval battle at Liugong Island
29. Although designated in 1977, the tomb of the Sultan of Sulu was not repaired until 1980.
In 1981 a Sino-Philippine joint venture produced his story as a movie The Sultan of Sulu (Sulu
wang), and in 1982 the Shandong Provincial Theatre Group produced it as a play, Sultan and
the Emperor [Sudan yu huangdi]. Xia Chunjiang, “Dezhou Suluguo Dong Wang mu sanji”
[Notes on the Tomb of the Eastern King of Sulu in Dezhou] Wenwu tiandi 2 (1985): 57. So in
addition to receiving state level recognition and popular media attention, the tomb has also
become a focal point for Sino-Philippine friendship relations, regardless of the fact that Sulu
was originally an independent sultanate, and would probably like to be again.
30. Shandong geming weiyuanhui gongbu [Shandong Revolutionary Council Decree] 23
December 1977, in Wang, Qilu mingwu bolan, 327–30.
31. This action provided the pretext for the German occupation of Shandong in 1898, and so
indirectly provoked the Boxer Uprising of 1900.
32. Jiang, Shandong Bowuguan Tonglan , 358-62.
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(Weihai), the tomb of Feng Yuxiang on Mt. Tai, Shihu Garden in Weifang, and
Dai Temple in Tai’an.33
The province published its second list of heritage designations in 1992 to
coincide with the national protection and rescue policy on conservation and
the newly revised Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics. Using the same
categories adopted in 1977, the province designated another 251 sites,
including: eleven “revolutionary artifacts and memorials”; sixteen stone
“grottoes, statuary, and carvings”; fifty-two “ancient architecture and his-
torical memorial structures”; 137 “ruins and relics”; and thirty-five “ancient
tombs and burial grounds.” So whereas revolutionary sites had fallen off
slightly from 1977, all other categories had grown significantly, especially
ruins and relics, which increased to 137 from just thirty-one in 1977.34
Imperialist relics chosen in 1992 included several architectural examples
from the German colonial period in Qingdao, such as the German
governor’s elaborate mansion, the police station, and the Catholic cathedral.
In Yantai, recognition was extended to a set of battlements from 1891, the
maritime customs post, the former British Consulate, and the Presbyterian
Church.35 Whereas in 1977 the only references to imperialism had been
resistance themes, in 1992 the actual sites of imperialism were being
appropriated as elements of officially sanctioned history. Many other promi-
nent colonial sites, however, have not received recognition, including the
turn-of-the-century Wilhemine railway stations in Qingdao and Jinan.36
Another site, apparently of more interest to foreigners than domestic
historians, is the Ledao Academy in Weifang. Established by the American
Presbyterian Church in the late nineteenth century, the academy was
among the earliest postsecondary institutions in Shandong and began edu-
cating girls a decade before the Qing government included women in its
education policy. During World War II the academy gained infamy under
Japanese occupation as one of the central internment camps for foreign
nationals, and it was here that Olympic hero Eric Liddell died and was
buried. The academy is now a middle school that preserves some of the
original buildings and a well-concealed commemorative marker to Liddell.
There is, however, no effort to advertise the site, and no way for any but the
most motivated investigator to locate it.
Revolutionary history sites guaranteed under the 1992 provisions in-
cluded the residence and tomb of reformer Kang Youwei,37 the birthplace of
33. Ibid.
34. Shandong sheng renmin zhengfu gongbu  [Shandong Provincial Government Decree], 20
June 1992, in Wang, Qilu mingwu bolan, 359-364. The Confucius complex also received
recognition as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994, as had Mt. Tai in 1987.
35. Ibid.
36. Jinan’s “German” railway station no longer serves its original function, and is off limits to
visitors.
37. The tomb had been repaired by private interests in 1943, designated as a provincially
protected site in 1956, desecrated in 1966, repaired in 1984, and designated by the city as a
protected cultural relic in 1985. Sun Shande, “Qingdao Kang Youwei Mu” [The Tomb of Kang
Youwei in Qingdao], Wenwu tiandi, 5 (1988): 40-41.
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the communist Dazhong Newspaper, and a number of revolutionary battle-
grounds, tombs, and memorials in the Yishui district, including the original
wartime headquarters of the Shandong branch of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). What is most remarkable about the selection of the CCP
headquarters and Kang Youwei residence as heritage sites at this time is that
they were not designated much earlier. This anomaly may best be explained
by the fact that these “revolutionary/reform” sites are located within struc-
tures that confuse the ideological distinction between nationalism and
imperialism. The Shandong CCP headquarters are in a former Catholic
church; Kang Youwei’s former residence is a comfortably appointed
Wilhelmine house, with room for his multiple wives. Because these struc-
tures inherently contradicted the dichotomised truisms of the revolution, no
cultural authority could touch them without risking the taint of imperialism.
By the 1990s, however, the policy of opening to the West had been firmly
established, and the rhetoric used to describe imperialism had been suffi-
ciently softened to allow for a cautious reconciliation of imperialism and
revolutionism/reformism within public history.
History and the corporate ethic: “Originating from real life but rising
above it.” Prasenjit Duara, a prominent historian of modern China, has
argued that the place of the museum within the nation (China as elsewhere)
is to serve national interests by helping to propagate an interpretation of the
nation as a “self-same, national subject evolving through time.”38 In refer-
ence to China, this argument is certainly correct in some respects, since
Mao-era museums were undeniably designed to support national, as well as
socialist narratives, with overt emphasis on revolution. But museum and
relic management in the post-Mao era reveals that although stateist narra-
tives are still promoted in some contexts, that interpretation is now divided
by subnarratives that promote a localized and increasingly commercialized
interpretation of the past that has a problematic relationship with the nation.
The state and its revolutionary history are most evident at certain
museums and monuments in locales that have closer physical ties with
the revolution. Ju County Museum, for example, possesses an excellent
collection of artifacts from the Neolithic Longshan and Dawenkou
cultures, and early dynasties up to the end of Han. But the mountainous
topography that allowed early civilization to develop in south Shandong
also gave rise to a history of rebellion and, in the twentieth century,
revolution. County historians interpret regional history as one of violent
struggle against oppression ending in revolution. As evidence, they cite
specific incidents of peasant uprisings in 519 BC, 99 BC, 14 AD, and 99
AD, followed by a loose string of unrelated dynastic peasant uprisings
and patriotic rebellions against the alien Manchu dynasty (1644-1911).
This finally establishes the link to the birth of the local branch of the
CCP in 1929, and the patriotic anti-Japanese resistance beginning in
38. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern
China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 4.
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1938.39 On the basis of similar remnants, historians in neighbouring
Yishui note the value of artifacts in promoting education in “patriotism,
historical materialism, socialism, and revolution.”40 Remote Meng
County has also designed a revolutionary history for itself through an
impressive museum and monument near the battleground of
Menglianggu, where the PLA once scored a victory that is now repre-
sented as a major turning point in the Civil War fight for Shandong.
Although these museums and monuments do have a legitimate claim to
revolutionary history, the extent to which they support an explicitly state-
centered interpretation of the past should also be seen as a consequence of
their incapacity to raise independent funds. These locations are far from the
present economic and cultural center of the province, and so have few
opportunities to attract a share of the burgeoning tourist market. As a
consequence, the exhibits continue to rely on government support, and so
are also the most likely to support the increasingly obsolete state narratives
based on patriotism, historical materialism, socialism, and revolution.
The state narrative is much less evident in the many new museums that
have been developed to reflect local character through unique aspects of
history or local production. In Zibo, for example, one can visit a range of
museums from the provincially protected Pu Songling and Wang Shizhen
memorials, to the Boshan Glassware Museum, or the Zibo Coal Mining
Exhibition Hall. In Weifang and the surrounding region, folk culture is
promoted through the Yangjiabu New Year Picture Museum, Weifang Kite
Museum, Gaomi Folk Art Exhibition Hall, and Shijiazhuang Folk Customs
Village. Qingdao continues to stress its relation with the sea through the
Marine Products Museum and the Naval Museum, and the coastal city of
Penglai has also developed its maritime heritage by adding the Dengzhou
Ancient Ship Museum to its original historic harbour. Penglai has also
attached another shipping museum to the Tianhou Temple on the fabled
Changdao Islands, which have been designated as an amusement park
largely devoted to the legend of the Eight Immortals, in which the islands
figure prominently.
But the most striking changes in museum organization during the reform
era are the adjustments toward commercialization. Su Donghai, a senior
museologist in China, explains that museology has until recently been
guided by the traditional principle of “preferring justice to profit” (anpin
ledao), but notes that this ethic is currently being replaced by the market
economy principle of “combining justice and profit into one.”41 This is
directly relevant to state policy of actively dismantling the planned economy
and pressuring the inefficient State Owned Enterprises to achieve fiscal
39. Su Zhaoqing et al., eds., Juxian wenwu zhi [Record of Juxian Cultural Artifacts] (Jinan,
Shandong: Qilu Shushe Chuban, 1993), 10-11.
40. Yishui County Cultural Artifacts Management Committee Yishui wenwu [Cultural
Artifacts of Yishui] (Yishui, Shandong: Yishuixian Wenwu Guanli Weiyuanhui, 1991), 114.
41. Su, “Museums and Museum Philosophy in China.”
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solvency. And although we generally think of this policy in terms of steel
mills and coal mines, since the mid-1990s these same principles have been
applied to museums. To solve their financial problems, many museums have
been turning to commercial sponsorship to aid in cost recovery. In 1998, for
example, the Weifang Museum opened an exhibit entitled Alcohol Culture,
including biographies of famous drinkers in history, and drinking vessels
arranged in chronological order to cover a period from Neolithic times to
the modern era. The exhibit concluded with displays devoted to contempo-
rary alcoholic beverages, and it was at this point that the viewer realized the
exhibit was sponsored by a local distillery. The image here is clearly not
representative of the self-same, national subject evolving through time that
has been suspected of monopolizing historical representation. Rather, the
nation is overshadowed by a self-same evolutionary subject of drinking in
history—proving that as in much of the former state sector, historicism is no
longer the monopoly of the state.
The city of Weihai provides a more comprehensive example of how
commercial management is changing the nature of historical representa-
tion. Weihai’s pleasant seaside environment and its official designation as
the “#1 Clean City of China” have made it a top tourist destination. Access
to international markets has also made it the focus of much investment by
entrepreneurs based in nearby South Korea and elsewhere, making it one of
the newly rich cities of coastal China. Historically, Weihai (Weihaiwei) was
a prominent naval fortress and the site of the defining battle of the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–95. But beyond the events surrounding this war, and
the city’s former status as a second-rate treaty port, it must be conceded that
Weihai has a comparatively shallow history. Undeterred by this handicap,
the city has been able to exploit earnings from the tourist trade and
commercial development to construct a significantly inflated local history.
This is achieved in part by arranging a thin collection of artifacts and a large
interpretative exhibit of colonial history in an elaborate new museum,
located outside the original city and in close proximity to the economic
development zone.
The climax of Weihai’s commercialized history, however, is Liugong
Island, the fortified base of the former Beiyang Fleet. In 1990 a visit to the
island required only a few yuan for boat fare, and once there, visitors could
choose what they wished to see. Later, the management of the island was
turned over to a city-controlled joint-venture management commission that
began to develop the island for tourism. At present, the boat fare must be
purchased as part of a package including admission tickets to most of the
island sites, including an expensive new museum dedicated to the disastrous
defeat dealt to the Beiyang fleet by the Japanese Imperial Navy in 1895. The
museum makes up for a lack of historical relics by presenting the visitor with
large dioramas of Herculean Chinese defenders crushing insipid Japanese
foes. There are few reminders that most of the actual crushing came at the
hands of the Japanese aggressors. In 1998, a staggering 1.3 million visitors
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were funnelled through these sites, and the commission is currently seeking
investment for a new series of attractions including a “submarine world” and
a cable car to connect the island to the mainland and boost visitor capacity
to 1000 people per hour.42
Another commercial success is the memorial garden to Pu Songling, the
master teller of fox spirit tales. Once a simple cottage and tomb, the whole
Pu garden has now become a monument to commercial tourism, and
although it had been named early on as a protected area, the site has also
been turned over to a corporation to be developed as a theme park. This
includes the large Liaozhai Hall, which has nothing to do with the historical
Pu Songling, but contains a version of the classic amusement park haunted
house, with themes drawn from Pu’s famous work Strange Tales from
Liaozhai. Outside, shops and vendors push a wide variety of souvenirs,
including toy foxes and fox hides, which may or may not have originated with
the actual “foxes of the world” penned up in an enclosure near Pu Songling’s
tomb. Although the actual Pu Songling residence is the original historical
article, it too has been overlaid by the mythological fox theme, which
includes fox gate-guards in place of the traditional lions, and a classical
garden where sculpted foxes play among the rockery. Although it may
delight the tourist, this and other modern additions throughout the environ-
ment present an abrupt challenge to the historical integrity of the site.
Tensions over this form of commercial tourism became graphically clear
at the Confucius complex of Qufu late in 2000 when the China Confucius
International Tourism Co. Ltd. attempted an unauthorized restoration of
some Confucian artifacts. This company had been formed as a partnership
between the municipal government of Qufu and a tourism development
corporation that operates under the slogan “originating in real life and rising
above it, discarding the dross and selecting the essential.”43 The company,
having signed a contract to assume management of eight prominent Confu-
cian sites (formerly under the care of the local cultural relics bureau),
undertook to clean the ancient steles and painted wooden plaques and
murals in preparation for the 2550th birthday of Confucius. The State
Bureau of Cultural Relics later accused the company of using water and
scrub brushes to accomplish the task, which caused extensive damage to the
delicate artifacts. The municipal government and its local relics board
predictably denied the allegations and insisted on the correctness of what
they called “reform” to attract higher earnings.44 The actual circumstances
are not yet clear, but whether the cleanup was botched or not, this case
42. Liugong Island Administrative Committee, “Liugong Island,” 1999.
43. Shenzhen OCT Tourism Development Co. is best known for its construction and
management of Overseas Chinese Town, a large “folk-village” in the southern city of Shenzhen.
Cultural traditions, ethnic minorities, and architectural styles are imported from around China,
and most of the country’s major historical sites are represented in miniature.
44. See consecutive reports in China Daily,  overseas version,  <http://www
.chinadaily.cn.com/>, 6, 9, 14, and 19 February 2001.
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demonstrates two problems: the state is losing practical control over its most
prized antiquities, and the overlapping and frequently contradictory laws
and regulations work at cross-purposes to a comprehensive system of
protection for historical properties.
Within the spiralling commercialization of history, the state continues to
make its presence felt through the overt patronage of high officials. Ex-
amples can be seen at Liugong Island, where President Jiang Zemin’s
calligraphy graces the entrance to the First Sino-Japanese Battle Museum,
and at Pu Songling’s residence, where the village entrance is decorated with
a large sculpture depicting the PLA “liberation” of Pujiazhuang in 1948. But
token endorsement aside, the state is effectively forfeiting its claim to
dictate public historical interpretation, and is relinquishing control to devel-
opers who are most concerned with creating profit-earning historicism.
Meanwhile, peripheral sites face budgetary crisis and have little opportunity
to support their collections and specific forms of historical narrative. The
extinction of more remote museums is already evident in smaller centres
and economically deprived regions of Shandong such as Heze, Pingyi, or
Anqiu, where they have either closed permanently or operate only during
high season.
Conclusion
From Confucius to mountain rebels, and Neolithic cultures to Commu-
nist Revolution, Shandong has produced some of the great moments in
Chinese history. But the preservation and representation of those moments
in modern times has emerged as a complex problem. The management of
museums and monuments has progressed from the general underdevelop-
ment of museums and monuments in Republican China, to the promotion
of science and theory in the 1950s, the destruction of museums and
monuments in the 1960s, and finally the economic exploitation of historical
capital in the post-Mao reform era. Chinese historical capital, therefore, has
evolved in direct relation to national political and economic policy. But
heritage has never been an unproblematic tool of the state, and seldom has
it been entirely constrained by direct control.
The contradictions inherent in the nationalization and management of a
body of largely elitist historical relics by an ideologically populist state posed
difficulties throughout the early years of the communist era, climaxing with
the “Four Olds” historical eradication campaigns. Having generally dis-
carded populist ideologies in the present, the relationship of the state to the
nonrevolutionary historical site is much more benevolent, but the state is
still seeking to divest itself of both the ideological and economic complexi-
ties of public history by turning management over to the private sector. This
has changed the historical landscape in ways that would have defied the
58 n THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN
imagination a decade ago, and promoted the consumption of public history
at rates not thought possible under the old planned economy.
But one thing these changes have not altered is the popular and perhaps
justifiable perception that Shandong is one of the most historically profound
regions of the world’s most ancient continuous civilization. With the rise in
disposable income brought on by market reform, that perception increas-
ingly finds its expression in historical tourism. This creates a problem for
public historians: although they may be able to cite the ancient ideal of
preferring justice to profit, they are still under pressure to make ends meet
by developing a popular interpretation of the past for mass consumption.
At present, the nation still prefaces itself as subject, but falling state
subsidies, the practical logistics of representation, and the local and com-
mercial nature of much new public history tends to be irrelevant to that
subject. This does not mean that nationalism has disappeared from public
history, because in some cases cultural nationalism has proven to be a highly
marketable commodity. But although this may serve the patriotic interests
of the nation, it is not a meta-narrative under the prescription of the state
and actually appeals to an appreciation of the historical past that transcends
the narrow definitions of the state. It must also be said that the public
historical site increasingly transcends the narrow definitions of the histo-
rian, whose sense that historical sites should maintain historical integrity is
being lost behind principles like “originating from real life but rising above
it.” But neither state nor historian can deny that commercial developers are
gaining momentum under the support of a national economic mandate that
is resistant to central planning and friendly to a growing tourist industry.
Public history is thus set to follow the same path as any other state-owned
industry faced with compulsory market reform. Those histories that adapt to
the market economy may become dominant tropes, whereas those that do
not may become footnotes in the public history of Shandong.
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Appendix
Chronology of Chinese History and Major Events in Modern Shandong
Dawenkou Culture ca. 4300 BC–ca. 2500 BC
Shandong Longshan Culture ca. 2500 BC–ca. 2000 BC
Xia ca. 2200 BC–ca. 1600 BC
Shang ca. 1600 BC–1066 BC
Zhou 1066 BC–221 BC
Spring and Autumn Period ca. 800 BC–ca. 300 BC
Warring States Period 770 BC–221 BC
Confucius 551 BC–479 BC
Mencius 372 BC–289 BC
Qin 221 BC–206 BC
Han 206 BC–220
Three Kingdoms ca. 220–280
Jin 265–420
Period of Disunity 420–581
Sui 581–618
Tang 618–907
Five dynasties 907–960
Song dynasty 960–1279
Yuan (Mongol) dynasties 1279–1368
Ming dynasty 1368–1644
Qing dynasty 1644–1911
First Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895
German Occupation of Shandong 1898
Boxer Uprising 1900
Xinhai Revolution 1911
Republic of China 1912–1949
Foundation of CCP 1921
Warlord Era 1917–1928
KMT Northern Excursion 1928
Jinan Incident 1928
Second Sino-Japanese War (WWII) 1937–1945
CCP Liberation of Shandong 1948
Foundation of Peoples Republic of China 1949
Cultural Revolution 1966–1976
Death of Mao Zedong 1976
Reform Era 1978–present
